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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF DEATH-WHEN REBUTTED.-
[Massachusetts] The wife of the alleged deceased husband filed a
petition for administration on his estate. The proof in support of
the petition showed that the husband left his home and family in
December, 1915, under circumstances strongly indicating an inten-
tion on his part to abandon them. He had been infatuated with
another woman, and both left the same day. He left a letter for
his son stating that he had been miserable at home and could not
live that way any longer, and that he hoped to have his son with
him at some future time. Within a day or so after his departure he
sent his wife the check for his automobile which had been left at a
garage in New York. Neither his family nor friends heard from
him after that. The petition for administration was filed in 1924,
nearly nine years after the husband was last heard from. The
probate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the death of
the husband had not been proved. The petitioner appealed, insisting
on the usual presumption of death from seven years' absence, un-
heard of, etc.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed the order of
dismissal.' The basis of this ruling was that under these circum-
stances the presumption of death did not arise, and in the absence
of satisfactory proof of death, the order of dismissal was proper.
The case did not involve the question as to whether the evidence
was sufficient to warrant a finding of death as a fact.
Until quite modern times the courts do not appear to have
recognized any legal presumption of death from absence.
In the earlier cases there are suggestions of a presumption of
the continuance of life, but none of a presumption of death.
The party whose case required the fact of death had the burden
of proving it, though it was sometimes thought to result from the
presumption of the continuance of life. Thus in one of the early
cases, 2 where the plaintiff claimed as heir of several deceased per-
sons, and the question as to who had the burden of proof arose, it
was said:
"He who would prove them dead; for when it is shown that they
were once alive, it will be intended that they are alive, if the contrary
is not proved."
For a time at least, both in England and in some of the Ameri-
can states, the continuance of life was treated as a true presumption,
requiring a verdict in favor of life in the absence of rebutting
evidence.
When the presumption of death from absence began to develop,
first as a permissible inference,3 and later as a rule of law that death
must be presumed from seven years' absence, unheard of, etc.,4 the
life and death rule came to be stated in these terms: that the pre-
sumption of life ceased at the end of seven years from the time the
1. (1925) Petition of Talbot 146 N. E. (Mass.) 1.
2. (1625) Throgmorton v. Walton 2 Roll. 461.
3. (1805) Doe v. Jesson 6 East. 80.
4. (1837) Doe v. Nepean 2 M. & W. 894.
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absent person was last heard of, and a presumption of death then
arose. 
5
Accordingly, in 1867, the Supreme Court of Illinois used the
two presumptions, seven years' absence to establish death, and the
continuance of life during the first seven years, to avoid the statute
of limitations.6
In one of the early pauper settlement cases,7 the presumption
of life was invoked to invalidate a second marriage.
In 1812, the husband enlisted and went on active foreign service
and was never heard of afterwards; about a year after his departure
the wife remarried. The second marriage was upheld on the ground
of conflicting presumptions, and that the presumption of innocence
destroyed the presumption of life.
In a later settlement case" the court repudiated the notion of
conflicting presumptions, or that there was any legal presumption
of the continuance of life, without reference to the circumstances.
The opinion suggests that the circumstances in the Twyning case-
service in the army on the continent in 1812, and absence of all
information since that time-rebutted the presumption of life and
warranted an inference of death.
In two recent cases,9 which are somewhat suggestive of the
Twyning case, the Supreme Court of Illinois has gone even further.
In each an administrator sought compensation for the death of
his intestate, which occurred in the course of his employment. The
right to compensation depended on the survival of certain relatives
named in the statute. It was a part of the administrator's case to
prove the survival. In the Keystone case the deceased was a Serbian
who had come to America shortly before the great war. In the
National Zinc Company case the deceased came from Russian Po-
land about the same time. Each left relatives in his native country,
who were proved to be alive about the time the war began, and no
further information had been obtained at the time of the hearing,
some two or three years later. The court took judicial notice that
both Serbia and Russian Poland were devastated by war, plague, and
famine.
Under these conditions the court held that there was not only
no presumption of the continuance of the lives of these relatives
but no basis to support a finding that these persons were alive.
In short, there could be no presumption of law or fact that life
continued in view of the circumstances which made death equally,
if not more, probable.
5. (1840) Loring v. Steinman 1 Metc. 204.
6. (1867) Whiting v. Nichols 46 Ill. 230. This'combination of the two
presumptions has generally been repudiated. If the absent person, is assumed
to be alive during the entire seven years, there would be no basis for a
presumption of death the next day. (1869) Phene's Trust L. R. 5 Ch. 139.
(1871) Lewes' Trust L. R. 6 Ch. App. Cas. 356.
7. (1819) Rex v. Inhabitants of Twyning 2 B. & Ald. 386.
8. (1835) Rex v. Inhab. Harborn 2 Ad. & Ell. 540.
9. (1919) Keystone Steel Co. v. Ind.st. Comm. 289 Ill. 587; (1920)
National Zinc Co. v. Indust. Coin. 292 Ill. 598.
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
The presumption of life, whether law or fact, rests on the usual
life expectancy under normal conditions, and fails when the condi-
tions do not justify it.
So the presumption of death as a fact, i. e., the inference of
death from long absence, unheard of, etc., rests on the probability
that the absent person would naturally communicate with his friends
and family, if alive.
Where there is no reason for believing that he would communi-
cate if alive, there is no basis for an inference of death from a
failure to communicate.
The legal presumption of death from seven years' absence,
unheard of, is a rule of convenience based on the natural inference.
Where there is no basis for a natural inference there is no basis
for the legal presumption.
"The principle on which the courts presume the death of a person
of whom no tidings has been received for a long period of time is this,
that if he were living he would probably have communicated with some
of his friends and relatives. It is a conclusion which the court draws
from the probabilities of the case. It is quite clear, therefore, that
where no such probability exists, the presumption can not arise."' 0
In the principal case the court applies the same rule to the pre-
sumption of death that the Supreme Court of Illinois applied to the
presumption of life.
E. W. HINTON.
PROPETY-ESTATES-CUTTING DowN A FEE.-[Maine] The
case of Methodist Church v. Fairbanks" may be compared to the
Illinois case recently decided 2 where a similar result was reached.
The comment recently published in these pages relative to the Illi-
nois case8 would seem to be applicable to the Maine case. In the
Maine case, the limitation was, X, testator, to A, his wife, and B,
his daughter, to their free use and benefit forever, and free from
the interference and control of anyone, but if, at their death, any
of the property shall remain, then over.
The Maine court proceeded apparently from the premise that
in that state a fee could not be limited upon a fee, and that the
effect of the language was to give a fee absolute in the first taker
so that there was nothing left for an executory devise to operate on.
It is interesting to note in that connection the following three
somewhat similar limitations that have come before the Illinois
court, thus: X, testator, to A, his wife, with full power to convey
or dispose of the same in any way she may see fit, and what of.
property, if any, remains after her death to go over;4 X, testator,
to A, his wife, to be her absolute property during her life, and what
10. (1854) Bowdem v. Henderson 2 Sm. & G. 360.
1. (1924 Me.) 126 AUt. 823.
2. Melies v. Beatty (1924) 313 Ili. 418.
3. ILT. L REv. XIX 459.
4. Bradley v. Jenkins (1916) 276 Ill. 161, 162.
